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PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS AND STATE OWNED
PUBLICATIONS: BEYOND KUHLMEIER )'
HAZEL WOOD SCHOOL DISTRICT

INTRODUCTION

A public forum is state owned property where government restrictions
on speech' must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.2 The majority of cases involving the public forum issue have focused
on only whether a particular geographical location was within the definition of public forum.' Since the late 1960's, however, litigants have been
1. State owned property is real estate or chattels in the government's possession.
First amendment rights are protected within certain of these properties that are considered public fora for the dissemination of speech. The first publicly owned properties to
come under the public forum rubric were streets and parks. See Hague v. C.I.O., 307
U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939). In the decades following Hague, several other kinds of state
controlled property were determined to be appropriate fora for free speech. See. e.g.,
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (municipal auditorium);
Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.) (city owned
airport), cerL denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); National Socialist White People's Party v.
Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir. 1973) (public school auditorium); Wolin v. Port of N.Y.
Auth., 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.) (bus terminal), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968); Reilly v.
Noel, 384 F. Supp. 741 (D.R.I. 1974) (State House rotunda); Dulaney v. San Francisco
Mun. Ct., 11 Cal. 3d 77, 520 P.2d 1, 112 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1974) (public utility poles).
Property that is not owned by the state carries no first amendment right to be used as a
forum for dissemination of speech. For example, the Supreme Court has held that there
is no first amendment right to distribute information concerning public issues at a privately owned shopping center. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976);
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972). But see PruneYard Shopping Center v.
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (decided under the California State Constitution).
The term "public forum" was first introduced by Professor Kalven in his Article entitled The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1. In Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 573 (1972), Justice Marshall, in his dissent, was the first
Supreme Court Justice to use the term in this context. Recently, the Supreme Court has
further defined the meaning and use of the term public forum in Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983) (defining three categories of
public fora). For a more recent case reaffirming Perry's analysis see Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3449 (1985) (reaffirming the
three categories of public forum defined in Perry);see also Stone, Fora Americana: Speech
in Public Places, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 233, 236-45 (a chronological description of public
forum analysis through the early 1970's); Note, Public Forum Analysis After Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association-A Conceptual Approach to
Claims of FirstAmendment Access to Publicly Owned Property, 54 Fordham L. Rev. 545,
548-52 (1986) (describing current public forum analysis and definitions).
2. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3448
(1985) ("Because a principal purpose of traditional public fora is the free exchange of
ideas, speakers can be excluded from a public forum only when the exclusion is necessary
to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that

interest."); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
("For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve
that end.").
3. See, e-g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (United States Supreme
Court building grounds); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (jailhouse grounds);
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trying to expand the protections provided by the public forum doctrine
to speech embodied in state owned publications.' These publications include high school, 5 college,6 and prison newspapers 7 as well as a city's
guide to services and organizations' and state bar association journals.'
Although a number of courts have addressed the issue,' 0 no consistent
rule has emerged for determining under what circumstances to categorize a state publication as a public forum." This Note proposes a test to
remedy this confusion. Part I is a brief history of the public forum doctrine and its application to state publications. Part II analyzes state publications in current public forum analysis. Part III examines the
inconsistency among the courts applying the public forum doctrine to
state publications. Part IV proposes a test and concludes that its application is the most appropriate way to analyze the public forum status of
state publications.
I.

HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE

In the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court advanced the idea
that the first amendment rests on the principle that the widest possible
dissemination of information promotes the public welfare. 12 "[I]t is only
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (New York City's Columbus Circle monument
grounds); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (public streets); Hague v. C.I.O., 307
U.S. 496 (1939) (streets and parks).
4. See, e.g., Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1983) (university newspaper);
Lee v. Board of Regents, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971) (same); Luparar v. Stoneman, 382
F. Supp. 495 (D. Vt. 1974) (prison newspaper), appeal dismissed, 517 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir.
1975); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (high school newspaper);
Alaska Gay Coalition v. Sullivan, 578 P.2d 951 (Alaska 1978) (municipality's guide to
local services and organizations); Huston v. Pulley, 196 Cal. Rptr. 155 (Ct. App. 1983)
(case deleted from California Appellate Reports by order of the California Supreme
Court dated January 26, 1984. 148 Cal. App. 3d 590) (prison newspaper).
5. See Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-836); San Diego Comm. Against
Registration & the Draft v. Governing Bd., 790 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1986); Gambino v.
Fairfax County School Bd., 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977); Reineke v. Cobb County
School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
6. See Stanley v. Magrath, 719 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1983); Kania v. Fordham, 702
F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1983); Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975); Portland
Women's Health Center v. Portland Community College, No. 80-558, slip op. (D. Or.
Sept. 4, 1981); Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266 (D. Colo. 1971).
7. See Pittman v. Hutto, 594 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1979); Luparar v. Stoneman, 382 F.
Supp. 495 (D. Vt. 1974), appealdismissed, 517 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1975); Bailey v. Loggins, 32 Cal. 3d 907, 654 P.2d 758, 187 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1982); Huston v. Pulley, 196 Cal.
Rptr. 155 (Ct. App. 1983) (case deleted from California Appellate Reports by order of
the California Supreme Court dated January 26, 1984. 148 Cal. App. 3d 590).
8. See Alaska Gay Coalition v. Sullivan, 578 P.2d 951 (Alaska 1978).
9. See Allston v. Lewis, 480 F. Supp. 328 (D.S.C. 1979), aff'd without opinion, 688
F.2d 829 (4th Cir. 1982); Radical Lawyers Caucus v. Pool, 324 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Tex.
1970).
10. See infra notes 66-109 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 66-109 and accompanying text.
12. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); Kansas City Star Co.
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through free debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains
responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected."'"
From this maxim sprang the public forum doctrine.
Initially, the public forum doctrine provided that certain publicly
owned property such as parks and streets were open to citizens for expressive activity.' 4 This doctrine is rooted in Justice Roberts' dictum in
Hague v. C.L O. " that streets and parks "have immemorially been held in
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions."' 6 In the ensuing fifteen years, a series of
"streets and parks" cases turned this dictum into doctrine." From
Schneider v. State, 8 in which the Supreme Court declared ordinances
prohibiting the distribution of pamphlets on streets unconstitutional,' 9
through Kunz v. New York,2 0 in which the Court invalidated a city ordinance prohibiting certain citizens from speaking about religious matters
on city streets,2 ' the seeds of the public forum doctrine were sown.
In Niemotko v. Maryland,23 Justice Frankfurter summarized the
"streets and parks" cases up to that time. 24 He isolated the central issue
of what came to be the public forum doctrine: how to join the free expression in public places with the primary uses of streets and parks. - In
other words, the law must accommodate speakers without disturbing
those using the public property for other purposes. Justice Frankfurter's
analysis laid the groundwork for the eventual application of the public
v. United States, 240 F.2d 643, 666 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 923 (1957); Clarksburg Publishing Co. v. F.C.C., 225 F.2d 511, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. F.C.C., 189 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 830 (1951).
13. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
14. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S.
147, 160-63 (1939); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939); see also Kalven, supra
note 1, at 1-3, 12-21; Stone, supra note 1, at 233, 236-45.
15. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
16. Id. at 515.
17. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271-73 (1951); Kunz v. New York, 340
U.S. 290, 293-95 (1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 560-62 (1948); Jamison v.
Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 415-17 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160-64 (1939).
18. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
19. See id. at 162.
20. 340 U.S. 290 (1951).
21. See id. at 293-95.
22. See Kalven, supra note 1; Stone, supra note 1, at 239-41.
23. 340 U.S. 268 (1951).
24. See id. at 276-83 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
25. Justice Frankfurter approached the problem of "how to reconcile the interest in
allowing free expression of ideas in public places with the protection of the public peace
and of the primary uses of streets and parks," by analyzing the "cases more exclusively
concerned with restrictions upon expression in its divers [sic] forms in public places." Id.
at 276. He first examined cases in which the only reason for abridging a person's first
amendment rights was to keep the streets clean. He next reviewed cases in which "regulation of solicitation" was the issue. Id. at 276-78. Finally, Justice Frankfurter analyzed
cases of disparate factual situations, ranging from the sale of religious literature by Jehovah's Witnesses to door to door solicitation ordinances. Id. at 278-82.
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forum doctrine to other geographical public fora. 2
From the 1960's to the present, the public forum theory has expanded
to include more diverse public properties such as: university buildings,27
municipal 28 and public school auditoriums, 29 state owned airports,3" government buildings and their grounds,3' public utility poles, 32 and state
owned bus terminals.3 3
Recently, in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators'Association,34 the Supreme Court clarified the public forum doctrine by establishing three categories of public property: public forum by tradition,
public forum by designation, and nonpublic forum.3 5 A public forum by
tradition is state property that has been used throughout history for purposes of assembly and the communication of thoughts between citizens.36
A public forum by designation is property that the state appoints specifically as an area for the dissemination of speech. 37 A nonpublic forum is
property that is neither by tradition nor designation a forum for public
communication.38
Although the majority of public forum cases have involved state
owned real property, state owned personal property, such as state publi26. Compare id. at 282 (Justice Frankfurter stated that "[w]hile the Court has emphasized the importance of 'free speech,' it has recognized that 'free speech' is not in itself a
touchstone. The Constitution is not unmindful of other important interests, such as public order, if interference with free expression of ideas is not found to be the overbalancing
consideration.") with Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) ("The State, no less
than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for
the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.") and Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) ("In addition to time, place, and manner regulations,
the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise,
as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression
merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view.").
27. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
28. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
29. See National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010 (4th Cir.
1973).
30. See United States S.W. Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United
States, 708 F.2d 760, 764-65 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (for a compilation of federal court airport
cases); Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S.
1124 (1982); Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
31. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (sidewalks abutting United States
Supreme Court grounds); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (state capitol building
and courthouse grounds); Reilly v. Noel, 384 F. Supp. 741 (D.R.I. 1974) (Rhode Island
State House rotunda).
32. See Members of City Council v. Taxpayers For Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984);
Dulaney v. Municipal Court, 11 Cal. 3d 77, 520 P.2d 1, 112 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1974).
33. See Wolin v. Port of N.Y. Auth., 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940
(1968).
34. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
35. See id. at 45-46.
36. See id. at 45 (quoting Hague v. C.I.O, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
37. See id. at 45-46.
38. See id. at 46.
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cations, also became susceptible to public forum analysis. 9
The first cases addressing a first amendment right of access to state
publications appeared in the late 1960's and early 1970's. 4 Although the
courts did not specifically refer to the publications as public fora, their
analyses were essentially those of the public forum doctrine. For example, in Radical Lawyers Caucus v. Pool,"' the district court of the Western District of Texas decided that a state bar journal could not refuse a
political advertisement when it had regularly accepted other commercial
and political advertisements in the past.4 2 Similarly, in Lee v. Board of
Regents , it was held that a state college newspaper, which was open to
some political and service advertisements, as well as commercial advertising, could not constitutionally reject the plaintiff's political advertisement solely because of its content.44
Implicit in these and other similar decisions is a finding that a public
forum existed because "the requirement of equal access is predicated on
the existence of a public forum. ' 45 Recently, courts have expressly applied the public forum doctrine to cases involving state owned
publications.4 6

II.

STATE PUBLICATIONS IN PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS.

Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association47
represents the Supreme Court's current version of the public forum doctrine. 48 The first Perry category, traditional public forum, is public prop39. See Portland Women's Health Center v. Portland Community College, No. 80558, slip op. (D. Or. Sept. 4, 1981); Luparar v. Stoneman, 382 F. Supp. 495 (D. Vt. 1974),
appeal dismissed, 517 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1975); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); see also Alaska Gay Coalition v. Sullivan, 578 P.2d 951, 956-57 (Alaska
1978) (analysis of the applicability of the public forum doctrine to state owned
publications).
40. See Avins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967) (the law review of a state
university), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968); Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266 (D.
Colo. 1971) (state college newspaper); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (high school newspaper).
41. 324 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Tex. 1970).
42. See id. at 270.
43. 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971).
44. See id. at 1258.
45. Alaska Gay Coalition v. Sullivan, 578 P.2d 951, 957 (Alaska 1978).
46. See, e.g., San Diego Comm. Against Registration & the Draft v. Governing Bd.,
790 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1986) (high school newspaper); Portland Women's Health Center
v. Portland Community College, No. 80-558, slip op. at 4-5 (D. Or. Sept. 4, 1981) (college newspaper); Alaska Gay Coalition v. Sullivan, 578 P.2d 951, 955-58 (Alaska 1978)
(government listing of services and organizations).
47. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
48. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3449
(1985) ('[h]aving identified the forum . . . we must decide whether it is nonpublic or
public in nature. Most relevant in this regard, of course, is Perry Education Assn").
In Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). a public
school system granted the incumbent labor union access to teachers' mailboxes but denied access to the rival union. Id. at 39-41. The rival union claimed that its first amend-
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erty that has "by long tradition . . . been devoted to assembly and
debate."4 9 In a traditional public forum, speech activity cannot be entirely prohibited. For the state to proscribe communicative activity, it
must show that the regulation is necessary by proving that it serves a
"compelling state interest."5 The second Perry category comprises "designated public forums," public properties set aside by the state as places
for speech activity.51 A state does not have to keep these facilities as
open fora. However, as long as it does, it is bound by the same compelling state interest standards that apply in the traditional public forum
setting.52 The third Perry category, nonpublic forum, is "[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public communication."5 3 Here, the state may
freely regulate speech activity as long as
54
the regulation is reasonable.
If state publications are public fora at all, they fall under the second
Perry category, designated public fora. State publications, by definition,
are developed for expressive activity. Publications, of course, cannot be
traditional public fora because they are not streets or parks.55 Thus,
under the Perry formulation, the questions addressed by this Note are
which state publications should be designated public fora, which should
be nonpublic fora, and why?
In several publication cases, courts have analyzed state publications as
designated channels of expressive activity. For example, in San Diego
Committee Against Registration and the Draft v. Governing Board, 6 the
Ninth Circuit held that a school board had established a limited public
forum and could not exclude speech unless it had a compelling reason. 7
ment rights were being violated, Id. at 41, alleging that the mailboxes were public fora.
Id. at 44-48. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that the mailboxes were not public
fora. Id. at 55.
49. Id. at 45. Examples of traditional public fora include streets and parks. Id.
50. In a traditional public forum, "the government may not prohibit all communicative activity. For the State to enforce a content-based exclusion it must show that its
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn
to achieve that end." Id.
51. The second category comprises "public property that the State has opened for use
by the public as a place for expressive activity. The Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public even if it was not
required to create the forum in the first place." Id. Examples of designated public fora
include municipal theaters and public auditoriums. Id. at 45-46.
52. See id. at 46.
53. Id.
54. "In addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the State may reserve the
forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on
speech is reasonable." Id.
55. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 3449
(1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
56. 790 F.2d 1471 (9th Cir. 1986).
57. In this case, the court held that "[h]aving established a limited public forum, the
Board cannot, absent a compelling governmental interest, exclude speech otherwise
within the boundaries of the forum." Id. at 1478.
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Similarly, in Luparar v. Stoneman,58 the District Court of Vermont
wrote that a state is not required to establish a prison newspaper. However, once the state establishes one it cannot censor the publication for
any reasons except those already permissible under the first amendment. 9 The language in both cases indicates that the state publications
were designated public fora."
If a state publication is not a designated public forum, it is a nonpublic
forum under the third Perry category where more restrictions on access
are permitted. 6 For example, in Allston v. Lewis , the court found that
once a nonpublic forum is involved, there is no first amendment violation
unless there is no reasonable relation between the defendant's restrictive
publication policy and its refusal to grant access to the plaintiff.6 3
In recent years, lower courts have applied the Perry analysis directly
to state publication cases.' Thus, it is becoming increasingly clear that
the analytical framework developed under the geographical public forum
cases will likely govern cases involving a right of access to state publications. The analogy, however, between a right of access to public places
and a right of access to state publications is imperfect.65 The concerns
58. 382 F. Supp. 495 (D. Vt. 1974), appeal dismissed, 517 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1975).
59. The court stated that "[t]he state is not required to establish or support an inmate
newspaper, and once it does so, it can withdraw its approval or support for any reason,
except those impermissible under the first amendment." Id. at 499.
60. Compare id. ("[O]nce the state has allowed a newspaper to be established, the
objection of prison officials ...to its editorial content is not a permissible reason under
the first amendment to prohibit its distribution.") and San Diego Comm. Against Registration & the Draft v. Governing Bd., 790 F.2d 1471, 1475 (9th Cir. 1986) ("Once the
state has created a limited public forum, its ability to impose further constraints on the
type of speech permitted in that forum is quite restricted."), with Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) ("Although a State is not required
to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by
the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum.").
61. The level of scrutiny used for analyzing restrictions on access to nonpublic fora is
more relaxed than the level of scrutiny required for the first two Per' categories. See
supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
62. 480 F. Supp. 328 (D.S.C. 1979), aff'd without opinion, 688 F.2d 829 (4th Cir.
1982).
63. Id. at 334. The Allston court listed some examples of reasons that would justify a
restriction in such a case: "avoiding the 'gray areas' of professional ethics, maintaining
the informational character of the publication, limiting lawyer referrals to other [and to]
separate Bar Association services focusing on the needs of the members of the bar as
opposed to the general public." Id.; see also Pittman v. Hutto, 594 F.2d 407, 411-12 (4th
Cir. 1979) (the court used a reasonableness test, which is the same as a rational basis test.
to decide that prison officials' concerns need only be reasonable to prohibit the publication of a prison magazine); Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1051 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)
(applying a rational basis test, the court ruled that school officials were permitted to seize
and prevent distribution of issues of a high school newspaper).
64. See San Diego Comm. Against Registration & the Draft v. Governing Bd., 790
F.2d 1471, 1474-78 (8th Cir. 1986) (specifically applying the Perry case); Kuhlmeier v.
Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1374 (9th Cir. 1986) (not mentioning Perry but
using public forum language found within Perr,), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S.
Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-836).
65. See infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
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underlying geographical public forum analysis differ from those underlying a right of access to state publications. The next Part of this Note
samples some of the divergent concerns in cases involving a right of access to state publications in order to highlight the current need for a
more uniform approach.

III.

THE INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC FORUM
DOCTRINE TO STATE PUBLICATIONS

A. High School Newspapers
Inconsistencies exist among the lower courts as to which state publications are public fora and how to analyze the question. Many cases arise
in the context of high school newspapers where school administrators
attempt to suppress certain speech because of concerns about how particular newspaper articles will affect students. 66 Some courts hold that these
student publications are public fora and enjoin unwarranted restrictions
on access. 6 Other courts, using a different analysis, conclude that high
school 68
newspapers are nonpublic fora and tolerate greater restrictions on
access.
In Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School District,69 for example, administrators of a high school deleted pages of the school newspaper because they
objected to the content of two articles.7 ° One article concerned student
pregnancy and the other discussed the impact of divorce on children.',
The administrators believed that the articles were inappropriate for a
high school publication.7" The Eighth Circuit, reversing the trial court,
proscribed the censorship, holding that the newspaper was a designated
public forum for the expression of student opinion.7 3 The Kuhlmeier
66. See Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1374-75 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-836); Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1050-51 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266,
1270-71 (D. Colo. 1971); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102, 103-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238, 241-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); see also Trager. Freedom of the Press in College and High School, 35 Alb. L. Rev. 161, 174 (1971) (restrictions
on students' first amendment rights have to be justified by a clear public interest).
67. See Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1372 (8th Cir. 1986),
rev'g, 607 F. Supp. 1450 (E.D. Mo.), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987)
(No. 86-836); Trujillo v. Love, 322 F. Supp. 1266, 1270 (D. Colo. 1971); Zucker v.
Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
68. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Board of Educ., 682 F.2d 858, 863 (9th Cir. 1982):
Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 517-19 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925
(1978); see also Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1466 (E.D.
Mo. 1985), rev'd, 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S.
Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-836); Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1052 (E.D.N.Y.
1979).
69. 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Jan. 20,
1987) (No. 86-836).
70. See id. at 1370.
71. See id. at 1371.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 1370.
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court found the public forum doctrine applicable by employing an intent
test that probed the school's purpose for creating a newspaper.7 4
Other courts disregard the intent test and employ either a "rational
basis" level of scrutiny7" or a "reasonableness test." 76 Under this approach, it is a foregone conclusion that the publication is a nonpublic
forum.7 7 In Frascav. Andrews,78 for example, school officials were permitted to seize issues of the high school newspaper and prevent their
distribution because they contained two letters about students on the lacrosse team written in language that the school officials felt was inappropriate for a high school publication. 9 Determining that the two letters
could have caused a substantial disruption of school activities, the Frasca
court held that the officials did have a rational basis for seizing the newspaper and that this did not violate student editors' first amendment
rights.80
Notwithstanding that the first amendment rights of the students and
the concerns of the high school administrators were the same in both
cases, the courts used completely different analyses. Using an "intent"
test, the Kuhlmeier court upheld the students' first amendment rights
over the objections of the school administrators.8 ' Using a "rational basis" test, the Frascacourt came to the opposite conclusion.8" However,
both tests are inadequate. They do not take into account the concerns of
readers or speakers. In addition, the lack of uniformity among the courts
leaves readers and speakers confused as to the extent of their first amendment rights.
74. See id. at 1372.
75. See Nicholson v. Board of Educ., 682 F.2d 858, 863 (9th Cir. 1982) ("[rhese
rights are not coextensive with those of adults and may be modified or curtailed by school
policies that are reasonably designed to adjust those rights to the needs of the school
environment."); Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 517 (2d Cir. 1977) ("[I]n order to
justify restraints on secondary school publications... school officials must bear the burden of demonstrating 'a reasonable basis for interference with student speech.' ") (quoting
Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 810 (2d Cir. 1971)), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
925 (1978); see also Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1466 (E.D.
Mo. 1985) ("school officials still must demonstrate that there was a reasonable basis for
the action taken"), rev'd, 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3493
(U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-836).
76. Courts use the words "rational basis" and "reasonableness" to identify the same
test. See San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 44, 47, 51 n.108, 55 (1973)
(using the terms interchangeably); cf Southwestern Elec. Power Co. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 304 F.2d 29, 44-45 (5th Cir. 1962) ("1V]e are considering whether the decision
of the Commission ... is a reasonable one--whether it has a rational basis.").
77. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n. 460 U.S. 37. 46 (1983).
78. 463 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
79. See id. at 1050-51.
80. See id.
81. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
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State Bar Journals

The same confusion exists in cases involving state bar journals.83 In
Radical Lawyers Caucus v. Pool,84 a group of lawyers attempted to place
an advertisement in a state bar journal announcing a caucus concerning
certain national issues." The editors of the journal rejected the advertisement and, in response, the group sued for access. 86 The Pool court
used the "clear and present danger test"87 where censorship of speech by
83. A state bar journal is a publication that is published by the state bar association.
The typical bar journal contains articles and advertisements that are relevant to the legal
profession. These journals welcome articles from members of the legal profession on
subjects of interest to the respective states' lawyers. See, e.g., Fla. B.J., Dec., 1986; Il.
B.J., Dec., 1986; N.J. Law, Nov., 1986; N.Y. St. B.J., Oct., 1986.
84. 324 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Tex. 1970).
85. See id. at 269.
86. See id.
87. Id. at 270. A clear and present danger test is a test that allows the state to suppress speech where the speech poses a clear and present danger to the state. The test
originated in cases arising under the Espionage and Sedition Acts of World War I. In
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), appellants mailed leaflets to men who were
eligible to enlist in the military. Id. at 49-51. These leaflets stated that the draft violated
the thirteenth amendment. The government convicted the appellants because their actions violated the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917 that forbade obstruction of military
recruiting. Id.
Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, believed that under ordinary circumstances, the
leaflets would have been protected by the first amendment. Id. at 52. However, under
the factual circumstances of the case, they were not. Justice Holmes wrote that "[t]he
question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are
of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Id. The Court concluded that the
first amendment could not be extended to protect speech hindering the war effort during
wartime. Id. For further cases contributing to the development of the clear and present
danger test see Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
The test went through a later phase of development during the Cold War. See J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J.N. Young, Constitutional Law § 16.14, at 859 (3d ed. 1986).
Supreme Court Justices and federal judges applied the doctrine in a more restrictive manner than had Justices Holmes and Brandeis. For example, in Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951), Chief Justice Vinson's theory of the clear and present danger test
was different than that of Justices Holmes and Brandeis. Id. at 508-09. His version of the
test contained two steps. Id. First, the government had to show a substantial interest in
limiting the speech activity. Second, the words or actions being restricted must be shown
to constitute a clear and present danger. Id. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203
(1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957). This approach enabled the Court to
develop a balancing test. This test balances the rights of free speech in society with the
state's interest in preserving national security. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
524-25 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the
First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877, 912-14 (1963).
During the 1960's, the Supreme Court formulated a stricter test that is more protective
of free speech. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam), the Court
created a test specifically for speech that advocated unlawful conduct. Id. at 447. "[The
state may not] forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except
where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action." Id. This new test focused on the inciting language of the speaker. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973); Watts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
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a state agency is prohibited unless there is a clear and present danger to
the public.88 Finding that no "clear and present danger" would be
caused by the publication of the advertisement, the court upheld the
speaker's first amendment rights to place the advertisement in the
journal.89
In Allston v. Lewis,9 a lawyer wanted to place an advertisement in a
state bar journal seeking counsel to help him in his litigation against
other attorneys. The advertisement was rejected. 9' The Allston court, using an intent test, ruled in favor of the journal holding that the publication was not a public forum but rather was more like a private trade
publication "not intended as a voice of the general public." 9
Although both publications were state bar journals, the courts used
different analytical approaches to determine whether the speaker should
be afforded rights of access. When a "clear and present danger" test was
used, the journal was, in effect, accorded public forum status.9 This test
is inadequate because it fails to take into account the editor's or owner's
rights. The test considers only the danger posed by the speech. Where
an "intent" test was used, however, the bar journal was held to be a
nonpublic forum and the speaker's right to access was denied.9" These
differing approaches illustrate the lack of uniformity among the courts.
This leads to uncertainty for aspiring speakers as to the extent of their
rights under the first amendment.
C. Prison Publications
In addition to high school newspapers and state bar journals, courts
seem to be at odds in cases involving prison publications. In Pittman v.
Hutto,95 inmates and editors of a prison magazine sued to enjoin prison
officials from suppressing an issue of the publication.9 6 Prison officials
asserted that certain of the articles were not in good taste.97 The Pittman
court used a "reasonableness" standard and decided that prison officials'
88. See Radical Lawyers Caucus v. Pool, 324 F. Supp. 268, 270 (W.D. Tex. 1970).
89. See id.
90. 480 F. Supp. 328 (D.S.C. 1979), aff'd without opinion, 688 F.2d 829 (4th Cir.
1982).
91. See id. at 330. The advertisement was rejected because it involved solicitation
and, as a trade publication of the South Carolina Bar, the paper could not accept it,
citing
professional ethical considerations. Id.
92. Id. at 334. "Although the Court [made] no ruling as to the presence of state
action in this case, the ... determination was made under the assumption this required
element [was] present." Id.
93. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
95. 594 F.2d 407 (4th Cir. 1979).
96. See id. at 408.
97. Id.at 409. The case did not describe the specific topics of the articles in dispute.
However, the articles were questioned "particularly with regard to whether [they] were
factually correct, whether they were 'out of line with good taste,' and whether the) were
'fair' to the administration and might be 'putting the magazine in jeopardy." " ld.
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concerns need only be reasonable in order to prohibit the publication of
the magazine.98 Because the officials' concerns for bad taste were reasonable, both the readers' and editors' first amendment rights were
ignored. 99
In contrast, Luparar v. Stoneman oo used a heightened level of scrutiny to determine whether prison officials could restrain the publication
of a prison newspaper because some of the articles were objectionable. 0
The Lupararcourt held that the articles did not threaten security, order
or rehabilitation and thus the restraint was not permitted.10 2 The court
used public forum language 10 3 and stated that once the state establishes a
newspaper, prison officials cannot impose regulations broader than necessary to protect legitimate governmental interests of prison security and
order. '04
Although both cases involved prison publications and the suppression
of speech, the courts used disparate analytical approaches. The Luparar
court used a reasonableness standard to allow prison officials to restrain
speakers' rights, whereas the Pittman court used an approach that is tantamount to holding that the newspaper was a public forum by strictly
scrutinizing denials of access.
Thus, identical factual situations in publication cases have disparate
results because courts use different analyses. There is a need for unity
98. See id. at 412.
99. See id. at 411. "[B]eliefs of the prison officials were not unreasonable." Id.
Therefore, deference was accorded to prison officials because they believed that the issue
of the publication "could be disruptive of prison order and security." Id.
100. 382 F. Supp. 495 (D. Vt. 1974), appeal dismissed, 517 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1975);
see also Huston v. Pulley, 196 Cal. Rptr. 155 (Ct. App. 1984) (case deleted from California Appellate Reports by order of the California supreme court dated January 26, 1984.
148 Cal. App. 3d 590); Bailey v. Loggins, 32 Cal. 3d 907, 654 P.2d 758, 187 Cal. Rptr.
575 (1982).
101. See Luparar v. Stoneman, 382 F. Supp. 495, 499 (D. Vt. 1974), appeal dismissed,
517 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1975). The specific topics of the objectionable articles are not
mentioned in the case. However, "[t]he central points of the state's objection to certain
articles... [were] that [they] are inflammatory, [and] that they attack personalities." Id.
at 500 (footnote omitted).
102. See id. at 500. Of course, prison officials and, to a lesser extent, high school officials, have an unusually strong interest in maintaining security and order. This interest,
however, does not affect the public forum status of the publication. Rather, the strength
of the interest goes to whether the state can overcome the appropriate level of scrutiny
once the public forum status of the publication has been determined.
103. See id. Public forum language, such as the words used in Cornelius and Perry,
state that once a forum is designated by the state as a place for expressive activity, the
government must have a compelling reason to suppress that activity. This notion is used
throughout public forum cases. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund,
105 S. Ct. 3439, 3448 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
104. See id. at 501. This is much like Perry's second category of designated public
fora. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)
("Although a State is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility,
as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public
forum.").

1986]

PUBLIC FOR UM AND STATE PUBLICATIONS

253

and consistency in this area of first amendment law. Unfortunately, none
of the existing approaches or tests are adequate.
The clear and present danger test is not always applicable since not all
denials of access to a publication are based on danger." °5 The intent test,
which consists of looking at the state's intent in creating a publication, is
difficult to use because intent is not always discernible. There are no
factors from which one can extract government intent and no guidelines
to follow in making an analysis. This leads to differing results, although
the fact patterns of two cases might be similar.' 6 The reasonableness or
rational basis test assumes the publication is a nonpublic forum. This test
would deny any publication the possibility of being considered a public
forum. It is a simple test for those who would censor speech to meet.' 0 7
Lastly, the strict scrutiny approach assumes that the publication is a public forum.108 Questions of reasonableness and compelling interests are
subsequent to the determination of public forum status. "
IV.

PROPOSED TEST FOR ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC FORUM STATUS OF
STATE PUBLICATIONS

This Note proposes a uniform test for determining the presence of a
public forum among state publications. The public forum status of a
state publication should depend on whether the publication has
equivalent counterparts in the private sector."' That is, if equivalent
private publications are available to the aspiring speaker for the dissemination of information, the state publication should not be a public forum.
This may be called the "competitive" situation. If, however, equivalent
private publications are not available, the state publication should be a
public forum. This may be termed the "non-competitive" situation.
Whether a publication is competitive or non-competitive depends on
the answer to two threshold questions. The first is whether the state publication, at its inception, is substantively and structurally similar to ex105. See, eg., Allston v. Lewis, 480 F. Supp. 328 (D.S.C. 1979), aff'd without opinion,
688 F.2d 829 (4th Cir. 1982); Alaska Gay Coalition v. Sullivan, 578 P.2d 951 (Alaska
1978).

106. See Cass, FirstAmendment Access To Government Facilities,65 Va. L. Rev. 1287,
1305 (1979) (To distinguish between public fora and other properties courts have used
two different tests. "One test is whether the property is suitable for public speech use.
The other is whether government has assigned the property for public speech use. The
two tests provide opportunity for different results both because they are, perhaps necessarily, imprecise and because the tests are not functionally equivalent.") (footnotes
omitted).
107. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
108. See id. at 45.
109. See id. at 46.
110. The term "equivalent counterparts" is defined as publications that arc substantially similar. To determine substantial similarity the following factors should be considered: 1) whether the publications reach the same audience in the same geographical area;
2) whether they are published with the same regularity; 3) whether they contain the same
proportion of advertisements to articles per issue; and 4) whether they are thematically
similar.
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isting private publications. The second is whether the audience of
existing private publications is substantially the same as the audience of
the state publication at its inception."' If, after careful analysis, both
questions can be answered in the affirmative, then the state publication
has equivalent private counterparts and should not be considered a public forum. However, if one or both questions are answered in the negative, then the state publication has no equivalent private counterparts
and should be given public forum status.
This test is appropriate for several reasons. First, it is co-extensive with
the ample alternatives analysis" 2 and, second, with the intent test" 13 both
of which are found in traditional public forum cases. Third, it addresses
situations in which a scarcity of fora mandates access. '" Fourth, quantitatively more actors' first amendment rights are protected by the use of
the test. I" Finally, it fulfills the purpose of the public forum doctrine, is
relatively straightforward
and is easier to apply than any of the existing
1 6
analytical approaches.'
A. Ample Alternatives
The proposed test comports with the ample alternatives notion originally found in some early geographical public forum cases."I 7 Under the
ample alternatives analysis, if there are alternative channels of communication where a speaker or a reader may contribute or obtain information,
then even without the protection of the public forum doctrine, no one is
denied the opportunity for free expression."' In practical terms, the
competitive situation is one in which there is opportunity for robust debate and the dissemination of information without the government providing a forum. In the non-competitive situation, the principles behind
the first amendment remain dormant without public forum protection.
111. It is important to note that under the proposed test a state publication's status is
assessed at the publication's inception. There either are or are not private equivalents at
that time. Under the proposed test, events after the publication's inception will not
change its status.
112. See infra notes 117-31 and accompanying text.
113. See infra notes 132-51 and accompanying text.
114. See infra notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
115. See infra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 166-67 and accompanying text.
117. See United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S.
114, 132 (1981) (discussing the appropriateness of reasonable regulation of speech in public fora as long as there are adequate alternative channels of communication); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980) (same); Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (same); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296, 304-05 (1940) (same).
118. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. 114, 132 (1981) ("This Court has long recognized the validity of reasonable time,
place, and manner regulations on such a forum so long as the regulation is content-neutral, serves a significant governmental interest, and leaves open adequate alternative channels for communication."); see also supra note 100.
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In Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'Ass'n,'" one factor
in the Court's decision not to consider an interschool mail system a public forum was the alternative means through which the union could communicate with the teachers. 20 The Court wrote that a "[s]tate may also
enforce regulations ... [that] leave open ample alternative channels of
communication." 1 2 ' These, according to the Court, ranged from bulletin
boards to the United States mail system. Thus, because the Court determail system was not a public forum, the union
mined that the interschool
12 2
access.
denied
was
One year later, the Court, using this ample alternatives reasoning in
Members of City Council v. Taxpayersfor Vincent, 12 1 held that an ordinance prohibiting the posting of signs on public utility poles was constitutional 124 and that this government owned property was not a public
forum. 125 The Court found that the "ordinance does not affect any indi-

vidual's freedom to exercise the right to speak and to distribute literature
in the same place where the posting of signs on public property is prohibited." 1 26 According to the Court, this was an ample alternative.' 2 7
This ample alternative notion has recently been imported from geographical public forum cases into publication public forum cases. For
example, in Allston v. Lewis, 128 the court denied the plaintiff access to a
state bar association magazine because the court reasoned that restrictions are permissible provided they do not foreclose all avenues of communication. 29 In other words, the existence of ample alternative
channels indicates a nonpublic forum. In Avins v. Rutgers,'30 the court
held that the law review of a state law school is not a public forum. The
court noted that plaintiff was denied access to only one of many law
eventually would have the opportunity to publish in one of
reviews and
13 1
others.
the
119. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
120. See id. at 53; see also supra note 48 (discussing the facts of Perry).

121. Id. at 45.
122. See id. at 53.
123. 466 U.S. 789, 812-13 (1984).
124. See id. at 817.
125. See id. at 815.
126. Id. at 812 (footnote omitted).
127. See id.
128. 480 F. Supp. 328 (D.S.C. 1979), aff'd without opinion, 688 F.2d 829 (4th Cir.
1982).
129. Id. at 333 (restrictions are permissible if "they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information"), aff'd without opinion, 688 F.2d 829 (4th
Cir. 1982).
130. 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cert denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968). Plaintiff sued the
editors of the Rutgers Law Review when they refused to publish his Article. The court
ruled in favor of the editors because the Law Review, even though part of a state owned
university, was not a public forum and the editors had complete discretion in deciding
whether or not to publish the Article. Id. at 152.
131. Id. at 153 (The court noted that "'sooner or later [the plaintiff will] be able to
publish in [another] law review").
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The ample alternatives doctrine enables first amendment jurisprudence
to be far more efficient. The proposed test addresses the concerns of the
ample alternative notion in the context of state publications by determining whether there were other publications where speech could have been
disseminated.
B.

The State's Intent

The proposed test is also in harmony with the intent test of recent
Supreme Court public forum cases, but it yields better results in cases
involving state publications. In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and
EducationalFund,3 2 the Court, as it had done in the past, used the government's intent for creating the forum as part of its analysis. The Court
stated that the government creates a public forum by intentionally opening a nonpublic forum for expressive activity.' 3 3 Therefore, the Court
looked at the policy and practice of the government to determine
whether it intended the property to be a public forum.' 34
The Supreme Court also examines the nature of the property and its
compatibility with expressive activity to discern whether the government
intended to establish a public forum.' 35 In Widmar v. Vincent, 136 the
Court analyzed a state university's express policy of making its meeting
facilities available to student groups.' 37 By examining the policy, the
Court found that the university administration intended to create a public forum. 138 In addition, the Court noted that the university campus
possessed many of the characteristics of a traditional public forum.i"'
Although "compatibility with expressive activity" is a useful analysis
for determining intent in geographical public forum cases, it is inappropriate in state publication cases. All publications are "compatible with
expressive activity." Rather, the operative question should be whether
132. 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985). The Legal and Educational Defense Funds brought suit
alleging that their first amendment rights were infringed because they were excluded from
participation in a charity drive aimed at government personnel. The Supreme Court held
that the charity drive was a nonpublic forum and ruled in favor of the defendant. Id. at
3442.
133. See id. at 3449.
134. Id. (The Court stated that governments do not create public fora by "inaction or
by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a non-traditional forum for public discourse. Accordingly, the Court has looked to the policy and practice of
the government to ascertain whether it intended to designate a place ... a public forum.") (citations omitted).
135. See id. at 3449-50.
136. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
137. Id. at 265-67. From 1973 until 1977 the University allowed a religious group
named Cornerstone to conduct its meetings in University facilities. It was the policy of
the University of Missouri at Kansas City to encourage student organizations to conduct
activities. However, in 1977, the group was no longer allowed to meet in University
buildings.
138. Id. at 267.
139. See id. at 273. These characteristics include an open forum already available to
other groups and to all forms of discourse.
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the publication is the only outlet for the expression. 40
Using the proposed test, one may infer the state's intent by determining whether the state publication is the only one serving the subject matter and the readership, 4 ' or whether it is only one contributor to a body
of similar literature that collectively presents a broad spectrum of

views. 14 2 Where a competitive situation exists, the state's intent is not to

provide a public forum but rather to open a public equivalent of competitive private publications. If the state publication is to be truly competitive, it cannot be intended as a public forum. A public forum would be at
quite a competitive disadvantage if it had to meet the compelling state
interest standard each time it denied access.
In the non-competitive situation, however, the intent of the state is to
provide a forum, giving people the opportunity to receive and disseminate information and ideas where previously there was none. Thus, by
merely establishing a publication for a community bereft of private publications, the state recognizes the need for a public forum. Of course, inferences of intent are always rebuttable.' 4 3 But in the absence of clear
140. Cf. Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475, 477 (4th Cir. 1983) ("The Daily Tar Heel
... in its role as a forum for the expression of differing viewpoints, is a vital instrument of
the University's 'marketplace of ideas.' ").
141. An example of a state owned publication that is the only publication serving the
subject matter and the readership is a high school newspaper. In Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1372 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3493
(U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-836), the high school newspaper was the only forum available to the student body for the expression of their views.
Another example of this type of publication is the paperback guide to services and
organizations in Alaska Gay Coalition v. Sullivan, 578 P.2d 951, 953 (Alaska 1978). The
book was the "single source of information" about local government and public services.
Id. Thus, using the proposed test, intent to create a public forum is inferred from the
absence of equivalent counterparts. See supra note 110.
142. An example of this type of publication is the law review of a state university law
school like that in Avins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
920 (1968). There are many law reviews to which writers may contribute articles and
which readers may choose to read. The law reviews published in this country comprise a
collective forum presenting a spectrum of views.
Another publication that, in and of itself, does not serve as a public forum, but along
with other literary publications of its type collectively makes up the forum, is the art
magazine in Advocates for the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 894 (1976).
Therefore, when using the proposed test, intent not to create a public forum is inferred
from the presence of competitive publications.
143. Certainly, if a state publication's charter or constitution provides a clear indication of its status as a public forum then it should override any inferences drawn according
to the principles of this Note. See, e.g., Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d
1368, 1371-73 (8th Cir. 1986) (the court looked at the statement of policy and charter of a
high school newspaper to determine that it was a public forum because the government's
intent was clear), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-836); San
Diego Comm. Against Registration & the Draft v. Governing Bd., 790 F.2d 1471, 1476
(high school newspaper's liberal publication policy evidencing government's intent to establish a designated public forum). The proposed test should be used where intent is not
so easily discernable. See Allston v. Lewis, 480 F. Supp. 328, 331-32 (D.S.C. 1979) (the
government's intent in setting up a bar journal was not clear), aff'd without opinion, 688
F.2d 829 (4th Cir. 1982).
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indications of intent, the pre-existence or lack of a particular "marketplace of ideas" will shed light on the state's intent in founding a
publication.
Thus, the law review of a state university law school"' and a publicly
funded literary magazine 145 presumably are not intended as public
fora. 146 In contrast, high school' 47 and college newspapers, 48 and a government's guide to services and organizations, 149 being the only publications of their kind available to their audience, are probably intended to be
public fora.'
Indeed, application of either the intent test or the test
proposed herein, would, in most cases, yield the same result.' 5' Thus,
the proposed test, while not looking specifically at the intent of the state,
harmonizes with the results of the intent test. The proposed test, how144. Avins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968).
145. Advocates For the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 894 (1976).
146. See Avins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151, 153 (3rd Cir. 1967) ("Traditionally, a law
review is student edited and the student editors determine the policies and decide which
of the submitted articles and other material are to be published."), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
920 (1968); Advocates For the Arts v. Thomson, 532 F.2d 792, 796 (1st Cir.) ("If [public
subsidizing of art projects] is to fulfill its purpose, the exercise of editorial judgement by
those administering it is inescapable."), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976).
147. See, e.g., Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1372 (8th Cir.
1986), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-836); San Diego
Comm. Against Registration & the Draft v. Governing Bd., 790 F.2d 1471, 1476-77 (9th
Cir. 1986); Gambino v. Fairfax County School Bd., 564 F.2d 157, 158 (4th Cir. 1977);
Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
148. See, e.g., Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 1975); Lee v. Board of
Regents, 441 F.2d 1257, 1259 (7th Cir. 1971); Portland Women's Health Center v. Portland Community College, No. 80-558, slip op. at 6 (D. Or. Sept. 4, 1981); Antonelli v.
Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (D. Mass. 1970).
149. See Alaska Gay Coalition v. Sullivan, 578 P.2d 951, 957 (Alaska 1978).
150. See Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1372 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-836); Portland Women's
Health Center v. Portland Community College, No. 80-558, slip op. at 6 (D. Or. Sept. 4,
1981); Alaska Gay Coalition v. Sullivan, 578 P.2d 951, 957 (Alaska 1978).
151. For instance, in Alaska Gay Coalition v. Sullivan, 578 P.2d 951 (Alaska 1978),
the court found that "[t]he publication was intended to provide a vehicle for the dissemination of information regarding public and private services and organizations in the
Anchorage area." Id. at 957. The proposed test would yield the same result because the
chamber of commerce publication is non-competitive vis-a-vis its subject matter and audience. In Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-836), a high school newspaper
was considered "a public forum because it was intended to be and operated as a conduit
for student viewpoint." Id. at 1372. Under the proposed test, the result is the same because, again, the high school newspaper is non-competitive. See San Diego Comm.
Against Registration & the Draft v. Governing Bd., 790 F.2d 1471, 1476 (9th Cir. 1986)
("[t]he evidence clearly indicates an intent to create a [designated] public forum." The
publication is the only one of its kind); Portland Women's Health Center v. Portland
Community College, No. 80-558, slip op. at 6 (D. Or. Sept. 4, 1981) (Reviewing the
written policy of the college newspaper and finding that "one of the purposes of [the
newspaper] is to provide a forum for communication within the college community."
This newspaper was the only one serving the college audience).
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ever, offers the advantage of obviating the need for resort to the less readily litigable concept of subjective intent.
C.

The Scarcity of Fora

Under the proposed test, where a non-competitive state publication exists, the publication is the only vehicle for the communication of ideas
and information to a particular audience. When only one forum exists
for the dissemination of certain ideas and information, the forum is as
scarce as, for instance, airwave broadcast frequencies where the federal
government requires fair access in order to promote the policies behind
the first amendment. This proposition was stated in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,15 2 where the Supreme Court introduced the fairness doctrine-requiring that broadcasters present issues of public interest and
that each side of those issues be given fair coverage.' 3 This is, according
to the Court, due in large measure to the scarcity of broadcast frequencies in the electromagnetic spectrum.' 54 This same scarcity rationale can
be applied to state publications to support a right of access. In Portland
Women's Health Center v. Portland Community College,' the District
Court of Oregon, relying on Red Lion, noted that an editor of a private
newspaper has a right to edit, but the editor of a publicly funded newspaper is not permitted to exercise the same degree of control.' 5 6
Thus, there is authority for the proposition that if a state publication is
the only one of its kind for a given audience, it should have a substantial
responsibility to grant access to opposing viewpoints.
152. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
153. See id. at 369-72, 400-01. The Red Lion Broadcasting Company broadcast a radio show which discussed a person named Cook. Id. at 371. When Cook heard the
broadcast, he felt that he had been personally attacked. Id. at 371-72. He demanded free
reply time, which the station refused. Id. at 372. The Court held that the fairness doctrine, which requires that broadcasters present issues of public interest and that each side
of those issues be given fair coverage, is constitutionally permissible. Id. at 400-01. This
is, in large measure, due to the scarcity of broadcast frequencies in the electromagnetic
spectrum. Id. Therefore, the radio station had to give Cook equal time to reply to the
accusations made about his reputation.
This Note does not suggest that the specifics of the fairness doctrine be imported into
the public forum doctrine. Red Lion is cited merely to advance the idea that scarcity of
facilities gives rise to concern for the need to share them. Access to state publications
need not be equal access and management of the publication does not have to take the
initial step of advocating or discussing a view before the opposing view is granted access.
154. See id. at 400-01.
155. No. 80-558, slip op. (D. Or. Sept. 4, 1981).
156. "While it is clear that an editor for a private newspaper has a right to edit, Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), it seems equally clear that the
editor of a publicly funded newspaper does not have such a right." Portland Women's
Health Center v. Portland Community College, No. 80-558, slip op. at 7 (D. Or. Sept. 4,
1981); see also Note, Public Forum Analysis After Perry Education Association v. Perry
Local Educators' Association-A Conceptual Approach to Claims of First Amendment
Access to Publicly Owned Property,54 Fordham L. Rev. 545, 555 n.101 (1986) (suggesting
that Red Lion scarcity combined with the public forum doctrine leads to mandatory first
amendment access to state publications).
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The Proposed Test is Responsive to the Rights of More People

The proposed test vindicates the first amendment rights of more people
involved in disputes over access to a state publication regardless of
whether the publication is competitive or non-competitive. In such a situation, several actors' rights are at stake. The taxpayer argues that he
does not want to support views to which he is opposed."5 7 The state has
an interest in regulating the content of its publication. 58 The editor
wants to exercise editorial discretion. 59 The speaker wants access
in or6
der to speak.' 60 The reader has a right to receive information.' '
Under the proposed test, the first amendment rights of the speaker and
the reader are always preserved. In the competitive situation, the
speaker and reader can disseminate and receive information in private
publications. In the non-competitive situation, the speaker and readers
are without recourse unless the state publication is given public forum
status. Thus, in the non-competitive situation, the first amendment
rights of more people hinge on the public forum status of the state publi157. See Panarella v. Birenbaum, 32 N.Y.2d 108, 114, 296 N.E.2d 238, 240, 343
N.Y.S.2d 333, 336 (1973) (taxpayers complained that the publication of articles attacking
religion in the student newspaper that is supported by public funds violated their first
amendment rights).
158. See, e.g., Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1370-71 (8th Cir.
1986) (public school officials wanted to suppress two articles they considered inappropriate for publication), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-836);
Pittman v. Hutto, 594 F.2d 407, 410 (4th Cir. 1979) (a prison official would not allow a
prison magazine to be published unless certain materials were deleted); Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (principal prohibited the distribution of
a high school newspaper because it contained two arguably profane letters); Luparar v.
Stoneman, 382 F. Supp. 495, 497 (D. Vt. 1974) (prison administration refused to allow a
prison newspaper to be distributed because some of the articles were objectionable), appeal dismissed, 517 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1975); Bailey v. Loggins, 32 Cal. 3d 907, 911-12,
654 P.2d 758, 760-61, 187 Cal. Rptr. 575, 577-78 (1982) (state prison officials wanted to
regulate the content of the prison newspaper by suppressing the publication of two
articles).
159. See, e.g., Avins v. Rutgers, 385 F.2d 151, 153-54 (3d Cir. 1967) (editors of a law
review rejected plaintiff's submission pursuant to their editorial discretion), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 920 (1968); Radical Lawyers Caucus v. Pool, 324 F. Supp. 268, 269 (W.D. Tex.
1970) (editor of a state bar journal refused to accept an advertisement because it was of a
political nature).
160. See, e.g., San Diego Comm. Against Registration & the Draft v. Governing Bd.,
790 F.2d 1471, 1472-73 (9th Cir. 1986) (antidraft organization sued to gain access after
its advertisement was rejected by the high school newspaper); Alaska Gay Coalition v.
Sullivan, 578 P.2d 951, 953-54 (Alaska 1978) (the Gay Coalition wanted to have their
group listing included in the municipality's guide to services and organizations).
161. See, e.g., Luparar v. Stoneman, 382 F. Supp. 495, 497-98 (D. Vt. 1974) (outside
subscribers sued prison officials when officials terminated the publication of the prison
newspaper to which these people subscribed. The outside subscribers felt that their right
to receive the newspaper was infringed), appeal dismissed, 517 F.2d 1395 (2d Cir. 1975);
see also Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867-69 (1982) (the Court rejected the
petitioners' claim of absolute discretion to remove any book from the public school library); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 559-64 (1969) (plaintiff contended that he has
the first amendment right to be free from the government's inquiry into the contents of
his library).
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cation than in the competitive situation. The proposed test is responsive
to the first amendment rights of the speaker and reader while keeping in
balance the interests of those who control the state publication. The latter are considered once it is determined whether the publication is a public forum by applying the appropriate level of scrutiny. 6 2 Other
approaches to disputes over access to state publications such as the intent
test 6 3 or the clear and present danger test 64 account only for the interests of the owners and managers of the publication without regard to
what recourse the speaker and reader may have.'
E.

The Test Fulfills the Purpose of the Public Forum Doctrine

The proposed test fulfills the purpose of the public forum doctrine: it
prohibits the state from denying citizens the opportunity to exercise first
amendment rights. In Associated Press v. United States, 66 the Supreme
Court stated that the first amendment "rests on the assumption that the
widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public."'' 67 If there are
equivalent private counterparts to a state publication, the policies behind
the first amendment are fulfilled because the ideas and information can
reach the same audience even if they are not published by the state publication. If the state publication has no equivalent private counterparts,
however, the test mandates that it be a public forum in keeping with the
first amendment values embodied in the public forum doctrine.
Finally, the proposed test is beneficial to public forum jurisprudence
because it is objective. The proposed test is manageable in its application
because it eliminates reference to subjective issues like intent or propriety
which are often difficult to resolve. Additionally, the test will promote
uniformity among the courts and relative simplicity in litigation. If a test
is objective, state publishers and speakers can better respond to it and
will be readily able to determine the status of the publication. This will
162. If the publication is deemed a nonpublic forum, those in control will be accorded
wide latitude in restricting access. If the publication is a public forum, only contentneutral restrictions will be upheld. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368,
1374 (8th Cir. 1986), cerL granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Jan. 20, 1987) (No. 86-836);
San Diego Comm. Against Registration & the Draft v. Governing Bd., 790 F.2d 1471,
1474-75 (9th Cir. 1986).

163. See supra notes 74, 92, 132-51 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 93-94, 132-134 and accompanying text.
In Allston v. Lewis, 480 F. Supp. 328 (D.S.C. 1979), aff'd without opinion, 688 F.2d
829 (4th Cir. 1982), the court used an intent test in deciding that a state bar journal was

not a public forum but rather a private trade publication. It was "not intended as a voice
of the general public." Id. at 334. Thus, an editor was allowed to reject an advertisement
without violating the speaker's first amendment rights. See id. By focusing on the founders' intent, the test is a mere scrutiny of the publication and the purpose for which it was
developed. This is unresponsive to the rights and privileges of readers and speakers.
166. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
167. Id. at 20.
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reduce disputes over access to state publications because speakers, readers, and publishers will be able to determine objectively their rights under
the first amendment.
CONCLUSION

The public forum doctrine is ever changing law that strives to fulfill
the values underlying the first amendment. The test proposed in this
Note is the most efficient way for courts to adjudicate rights of access to
state publications. It comports with the ample alternatives and intent
notions in traditional public forum analysis. It addresses the problems
that can arise in situations when a state publication is the only publication of its kind. In addition, the test protects the first amendment rights
of more people. Finally, it fulfills the purpose underlying the public forum doctrine and is more objective than existing analytical approaches.
Pamela A. Schechter

